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Editor’s Introduction to “Social Norms” by Heinrich Popitz
Individuals, groups, and societies have been known to make rather quick and radical shifts 
in social norms; making theft, insult, beating, torture, and (mass)-killing standard, or encouraged 
behavior, where previously considered unacceptable. In order for Holocaust and genocide scholars 
to appropriately research these changes, proper theories need to be developed on the emergence, 
stabilization, weakening, and changing of social norms.  
Fortunately, a field of study exists that addresses these questions. Social theory deals with 
action, social order, and social change, and therefore, offers insightful explanatory models for such 
norm changes. Although social norms are addressed in genocide studies, social theory remains 
largely underrepresented in these discussions. The culture of a mainly English speaking and 
therefore, English publishing community, has led to a concentration on a limited number of 
conceptualizations. However, there are many contributions in other languages that represent a 
broad variety of epistemologies which can enrich the scholarship on mass violence. Specifically, in 
regard to social theory, Germany has a wealth of knowledge to contribute that goes further than 
many of the sources most often cited. In this very context, GSP is proud to present the German 
sociologist Heinrich Popitz, who has published not only on violence,1 but who has also developed a 
theory dealing with the establishment, stabilization, crisis, and change of social norms. His writings 
are devoid of traditional sociological formations, making them easily accessible for academics from 
various backgrounds, much like the diverse disciplines within our genocide scholars community.
Heinrich Popitz defines norms as those expected forms of regular behaviour whose absence 
or violation causes social sanctions.2 The repertoire ranges from disapproval over repressions, to 
discrimination and punishment. However, in complex societies, the extension of norms, or their 
violation, occurs on a regular basis. Individuals violate others expectations for various reasons. 
They might do so intentionally (knowingly and deliberately), the violation might be a side effect 
(not the goal of the action) or completely unintended (a simple action). It might be the consequence 
of creative processes (which could be done differently) or simply because of laziness and a lack of 
interest. People know of a norm when they expect sanctions as a result of its violation, or when they 
react to other people’s violations with sanctions. In a simple case, a violation of a norm is followed 
by a negative reaction. As a consequence, the norm is kept intact and the social order in question 
is stabilized. Accordingly, not only the degree to which a norm is followed indicates its validity, 
but also the readiness to protect it. This is the key to the processes of change; norms subdue, lose 
their influence on actions, and the violation of those norms is sanctioned only hesitatingly, or 
eventually, not at all. Correspondingly, the expectation to be sanctioned is lowered, and thus the 
authority of the norm fades. Individuals in many cases do not know whether other members of the 
community obey these norms, which also contributes to their instability.3 There are many reasons 
for the absence of sanctions. One is that the lacking disapproval of violations entails considerably 
fewer sanctions than does the violation of the norm itself. According to Popitz, there is a higher 
importance placed on the actions which take place, and the norm violations or lack of sanctioning 
violations due to laziness or disinterest are of a lesser importance. Norms are produced by actions, 
they are stabilized, questioned, and violated by them. In this sense, non-acting does not exist. Not 
to sanction the violation of a norm might lead to its continuation. Accordingly, the focus is not 
on the values that inform actions, but on the social relations within the norms, which function to 
inform the actions that are performatively negotiated.4 Consequently, norms cannot be empirically 
recorded by people stating which norms are valid in their opinion. They can only be empirically 
recorded when actual actions are observed. 
1 Heinrich Popitz, Phenomena of Power. Authority, Domination, and Violence (New York: University of Columbia Press, 2017) 
[2nd German extended Edition 1992].
2 Also for the following: Heinrich Popitz, Soziale Normen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006).
3 Andreas Diekmann and Wojtek Przepiorka, Heiko Rauhut, “Die Präventivwirkung von Nichtwissen im Experiment,” 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 40, no. 1 (2011), 74-84.
4 About norm transformation in the context of genocidal violence see Paul Morrow who, however, does not discuss the 
crucial role actions play in such processes: Paul Morrow, “The Thesis of Norm Transformation in the Theory of Mass 
Atrocity,” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 9, no. 1 (2015), 66-82, accessed July 24th, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-
9933.9.1.1303.
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Popitz illustrates how far actions can fundamentally change power relations and social orders.5 
He presents the example of a ship with a limited number of deck chairs and their distribution.6 
The chairs are used as they are required, and as the ways and times to use them differ, a casual 
arrangement develops. However, when new people arrive on board and others leave the ship, a 
minority – the new arrivals – change the accepted practice. These people reserve the unused deck 
chairs for each other. This action establishes a norm: it results in a mutual confirmation of claims. 
What is done, is considered acceptable because others do it too, and it is done for each other. This 
leads to multiple consequences. First, two groups are created: the privileged and the excluded. 
While the action of the first group generates an organizational structure, this is missing in the 
second group. The second group should organize itself, seek confrontation, and eventually defend 
its newly acclaimed right. Even if the confrontation resulted in victory, new social orders and social 
norms would have been established.
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*Translation of Heinrich Popitz. Soziale Normen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2006, 61-75. The original 
footnotes were only translated but not reformatted and therefore do not adhere to the journals style guidelines.
It is a simple, if not, even trivial, experience in daily life that social behavior is norm-bound. We 
regularly arrive at crossroads with a green or red traffic signal – in social situations that obviously 
have already been discovered, captured, preformed by others. We are not free to choose to ignore 
this preformedness; the fact that situations are already equipped with positively or negatively 
evaluated alternative solutions. If we take no heed of the green and red lights, our behavior will, 
nonetheless, be interpreted by others as an answer to these signals - even if it was not at all our 
intention that we should be asked a question. Therefore, we can state in a first approximation: The 
fact that behavior is norm-bound means that social situations are burdened with certain alternatives 
that seem to be based on agreements of some sort; agreements, of which it is not really known 
who exactly has reached them; agreements that we cannot dispose of merely by not accepting 
them case-by-case. They are somehow designed to endure in such a way that an individual cannot 
deliberately suspend them.  
This peculiar phenomenon is the subject of the following considerations. I would like to 
try to point out the approach taken by sociological thought and some of the fundamental terms 
of sociological research by asking for features illustrating that social actions are norm-bound. 
Since these features can be traced in all cultures known to us, they may guide the analysis of 
fundamentally different social orders.1 
The fact that humans cast their behavior in social terms, that they make themselves socially 
liable, is a highly peculiar achievement. Yet how exactly do we accomplish this achievement?
A first answer does not lead us very far but is a prerequisite for any further meaningful 
discussion of the question. We must remember that the way social life is shaped or formed is as 
little predetermined as is the way nature is shaped. Societisation (Vergesellschaftung) is always 
artificial.
Of course, many social behavioral imperatives and prohibitions are closely related to biological 
conditions, such as the difference between the sexes, birth, childhood, ageing, and death. However, 
the comparison of cultures illustrates that even these biological conditions are socially reshaped in 
different cultures in completely different ways. So, in every culture diverse modes of behavior are 
presented to men and women in some typical, frequently reoccurring situations. Consequently, 
the difference between the sexes is also somehow expressed by the formulation of social norms. 
If, however, the social norms attributed to women in the cultures known to us are compared with 
each other, it turns out that it is extremely difficult to find universally valid similarities, features 
“essential” to their modes of behavior. As regards the assessment of the respective appropriate 
behavior, the biological difference between the sexes is obviously nothing more than a starting 
point, a first approximation from which in each culture a specific set of features defining the 
“essential” differences between sexes develops. Each of these culture-specific variants seems to us, 
from the outside, to be more or less arbitrary – or, more precisely, artificial. 
Likewise, the relation between birth, ageing, and death exhibits an almost boundless variability. 
Among the approaches to problems as vital as suicide, war, and the relation to the deceased, as 
far as I can see, no universal human stock can be determined that would express itself in socially 
binding modes of behavior in all cultures. The dealings with the deceased can be constitutive for 
the entire social order; obligations that shape the whole life can be attached to death – yet we may 
also attempt to socially ignore it. 
1 I hereby present my unmodified inaugural lecture at the University of Basel, held at November 15, 1960. As the occasion 
implies, no prior sociological knowledge is necessary to understand the text. It was my aim, as is stated in the text, 
“to find, among the multitude of phenomena we consider natural in social life, some of those that actually are”. The 
complementary notes add some further information. 
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The incest taboo seems to be closest to a universally valid norm. However, the incest taboo 
may also not only be transgressed (otherwise it would be a natural law, not a norm) but, since it is a 
normative behavioral requirement, it can also be suspended.2 
Instead of demonstrating with many more examples, it is worth remembering just how old 
and venerable the recognition of the relativity of social behavioral imperatives is. Herodot relates 
the following anecdote: 
Darius, during his rule, called into his presence certain Greeks who were at hand, and asked 
– ‘What he should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they died?’ To which they 
answered, that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent 
for certain Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, 
while the Greeks stood by, and knew by the help of an interpreter all that was said – ‘What he 
should give them to burn the bodies of their fathers at their decease?’ The Indians exclaimed 
aloud, and bade him forbear such language. Such is men’s wont herein; and Pindar was 
right, in my judgment, when he said, ‘Law is the king o’er all.’3 
Why particular behavioral norms in a particular culture and under particular conditions are 
“the king o’er all” – is, of course, the topic of attempts of sociological explanations of all kinds. For a 
start, though, it may now be safely claimed that the search for features illustrating that social actions 
are norm-bound cannot be completed by seeking social norms whose contentual determination is 
universally valid.  
We may describe this conditionality of culture and the “relativity” of social norms from two 
vantage points as the social plasticity of humans – their shapeability, their responsiveness to the 
most diverse concepts of order – and as their social productivity: The creative energy and fantasy 
with which humans design the orders of their social life, interpret biological facts, reshape 
conditions, and stylize themselves in their behavior. Both phenomena mutually challenge each 
other. The question posed by social plasticity is of a compulsory nature – a compulsion to create. 
And the answer that must be given is productive, not only in the sense that a choice is made within 
a given range of options, but more importantly, as a decision by which humans determine and 
shape themselves, by which they define themselves socially. This human determination of the self 
always is based on a normative decision: it is consequently, always imperative, a demand – or to put 
it differently, a hope.
However, at this point, an approach becomes visible, and though it seems to be of such a 
self-evident nature that it does not require further discussion, nonetheless some universally valid 
features illustrating that social actions are norm bound may deduced. It is a condition that is 
grounded beyond all culture-specific variations in the “fact society” itself: the human determination 
of the self as a social being mentioned above is inherently mutual – i.e., it is a determination of each 
other.  
Social norms apparently restrict the arbitrariness in relationships between people. They ensure 
that people can relate to each other with some certainty and permanence. Yet this coordination 
would not be possible without our ability to predict the actions of the respective other in situations 
that recur frequently so that we can anticipate regularities.4 The efficacy of the phenomenon that 
social actions are norm-bound may therewith be described as a kind of “construction” of regular 
and mutually predictable courses. It is exactly this mutual predictability, this co-operation with 
each other or plainly: this reciprocity that is subject to specific “principles of construction” and that 
2 On the issue of the universality of the incest taboo see Murdock, Georg Peter, Social Structure, New York 1949, pp. 284 ff. 
Murdock reaches some remarkably clear and definite generalizations that, however, are based on a limited amount of 
data. Examples contradicting Murdock’s theses can be found, for instance, in Thurnwald, Richard, Die menschliche 
Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen, vol. II, Berlin/Leizig 1932, p. 162f. 
3 Herodot, The Histories of Herodotus. Book III, section 38. Edited by Blakeney, E. H.; quoted in the translation by George 
Rawlinson. London 1964, 229-230. Herodot obviously misunderstands the meaning of the nomos-concept in Pindar. – 
On the so called endocannibalism cf. Herodot, I, 216 and III, 99. 
4 The relevance of the predictability of social actions is especially emphasized by Geiger, Theodor, Vorstudien zu einer 
Soziologie des Rechts, in: Acta Jutlandica XIX, 2, Aarhus/Kopenhagen 1947, p. 14f., 57f.
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consequently yields some partial answers to the question with which we set out: the question of 
how humans actually manage to bind their social actions to norms. 
For reasons of clarity I would like to distinguish five such (partial) answers.
First. – “Nobody may hunt this animal” – “In this situation, you may enter your neighbor’s 
house, but not in that situation” – “A child must go to bed early at night”: These are formulated 
norms of different types. They have in common that they standardize actions and situations. 
Considered from the viewpoint of the child that has to go to bed at night, the situation today 
completely differs from that of yesterday or the day before yesterday. When considered from 
the parents’ viewpoint, it is different than the child’s; just as the observer’s viewpoint is different 
than from the participants’. Yet, the marking of specific actions as “binding” presupposes that we 
have found criteria that render subjectively different actions and situations to be the same or at least 
comparable. These criteria represent a selection of specific features of actions and situations that 
must be learned by each following generation. Indeed, the feat of education does, after all, consist 
not least in the ability to bring to bear a certain repertoire of standardized situations against the 
backdrop of a wealth of subjective-individual situations experienced by the child. 
So at this point it should be noted that every normative interpretation of actions and situations 
limits the social relevance of the individual’s experiential sphere. (Every normative interpretation: 
accordingly not only those oriented towards legal statutes.) Norms always create an artificial level 
of communication between people at which not everything “counts” that we experience, feel, 
and believe to perceive.5 No psychological or phenomenological or sociological theory of guilt 
can eliminate the possibility or, indeed, the probability of subjective injustices caused by this 
fundamental condition of the establishment of social norms: Social norms cannot be valid unless 
generally binding standardizations of actions and situations are recognized and asserted as valid – 
and, as we shall see, these standardizations are of a particular nature.
Second. – The sentence: “Nobody must hunt this animal” is a formulated norm that obviously 
addresses all members of a particular universe of well-ordered relationships. The sentence “A 
child must go to bed early at night” explicitly refers to some members, the children. Other norms 
are addressed specifically to the “fathers”, “mothers”, “medicine men”, “master-workmen”. 
Accordingly, social norms do not only include standardizations of situations and actions, but also 
of people. They are directed towards a certain person insofar as he is father, medicine man or citizen. 
Additionally, these standardizations do not only comprise the actual agents, but also all those that 
are “meant”, that are affected by a particular action. The kind of behavior that is expected from a 
child also essentially depends on whether the action is related to his parents, or his playmates, or 
his teachers.  
All of this seems to be natural to us. It is also natural to assume that social groups are not a 
clutter of uniform elements but an intrinsically differentiated fabric of rights and obligations. What 
we would like to assert, is merely a condition of this possibility: social norms can contribute to the 
determination of a differentiation between various categories of people, between different “social roles”, 
to adopt Ralph Linton‘s term.6 This differentiation is not arbitrary insofar as it is supposed to result 
in a structured coexistence. Rather, the separate social roles must mutually imply each other: The 
family father must fulfill certain duties that, for instance, relate to children, and in turn, he himself 
expects the corresponding reaction of the child to follow behavioral commands. Furthermore, the 
different obligations of one person, e.g. those of the father and husband, must (at least in principle) 
be compatible with each other. And finally, the special social norms must complement each other 
5 The sameness or comparability of social situations accordingly is not, as is sometimes implied, a methodical fiction of 
sociologists who interpret social orders; but it is an effort of abstraction that must always be carried out when people 
make their action predictable in a binding manner. Social orders are founded on such efforts of abstraction.   
6 Linton, R., The Study of Man. New York 1936. New vantage points are developed by: Dahrendorf, Ralf, Homo 
Sociologicus. Ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle, Köln/Opladen 1959. See 
there for further literature. [There seems to be a journal article with the same title that was translated into English: 
Homo Sociologicus, An Essay on the History, Meaning and Critique of the Category of Social Role, in: Kolner 
Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 1958, Vol.10 (2), pp. 178-208.  The second part with the same title was 
published in issue 3, pp. 345-378.]
Popitz
©2017     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 2 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.2.1552
8
in such a way that they result in a viable whole, a “working” fabric of diverse performances. This 
mutual implication, i.e. specific quality of social norms to be attuned to and to complement each 
other – results in the norm structures of different social units: for instance, of a school class in 
contrast to a club, an industrial firm in contrast to a family, the patriarchal extended family in 
contrast to the urban nuclear family. 
We have currently achieved arguably the highest degree of rationalization of these distributions 
and combinations of behavioral imperatives in modern bureaucracy – at least as regards their 
aspiration, their “design”.7 Yet, the particularly elaborated bureaucratic systematization of 
competences is also based on principles that can be found in their fundamental form in every 
place where people attempt to organize their coexistence. We can always observe a kind of “labor 
division” of behavioral imperatives and prohibitions that can be described for each case as a 
particular fabric of social roles. 
Third. – We have talked about norm structures – a fabric of interrelated social roles – that 
distinguish social units (groups, collectives). Everyday experience tells us that an individual is 
a member of various social units, a bearer of various social roles.8 This diversity of memberships 
often is interpreted as a specifically modern phenomenon: as a consequence of modern pluralism, 
the separation between private and public sphere, the “decay of institutions”, or other afflictions 
which the critic of the present day likes to invoke for himself and his contemporaries. However, 
it is by no means a particularly modern phenomenon. Instead we can dare to formulate the 
following, empirically verifiable thesis: Every human – with the exception of the very small child 
that completely merges in its family and, of course, with the exception of hermitism and the like – 
every human being in every culture that we know is a member of various social units. Even in Australian 
Aboriginal clan cultures in which the local unit is in accord with the extended family, at least 
relationships with relatives are realized that extend to other local units. Accordingly, here – in the 
extreme case – we can also distinguish at least two social units that the individual is obliged to – 
even if the nuclear family is not perceived as a separate functional unit. 
The conventional notion that perceives the individual as the opposite of “society” is accordingly 
misleading. Every individual is always – if just for once we use the expression – a member of 
various societies. Wherever people design structures of coexistence, the result is a multitude of 
overlapping and intersecting social units – an ever-recurring formative principle of societization 
(Vergesellschaftung). It seems to me, that the question as to why this is so has not been answered 
satisfactorily so far if, indeed, it has not even been sufficiently unambiguously formulated. 
I must restrict myself to pointing out merely one consequence. The multiplicity of intersecting 
and overlapping obligations means that the possibility of a norm conflict is in principle inherent 
to a structure of social arrangements. Indeed, a “value crisis” is not necessary to evoke situations 
for individuals and groups that confront them with different expectations depending on the 
different interpretations of members of particular groups. We can observe a latent competition of 
interests between social units in all cultures – including those that we usually regard as particularly 
homogenous. 
Yet, maybe the degree of non-homogeneity of the various social obligations correlates with 
the degree to which a person is aware of him- or herself as existing individually. Maybe the latent 
competition and possibilities of conflict of the individually intersecting norm structures have to 
manifest themselves before we can reflect our social ties as a dimension of human life and gain the 
distance necessary to develop a specifically individual reflection on ourselves. This would imply a 
7 On this issue compare Merton, Robert K., Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, in: Social Theory and Social Structure, 
Glencoe 21957, p. 211 f. 
8 Unfortunately, as yet no unified terminology and classification of social forms has been established. I use here “social 
unit” as an umbrella term for social groups and collectives. – In this context, I would like to avoid the usually 
employed features of the term such as “we-awareness”, “sense of solidarity” and others. I believe it is enough to 
identify social units as a fabric of interrelated social roles. Hereby the linking element – the differentiation between 
“inside” and “outside” is sufficiently indicated. And not only because of the mutual interrelatedness of social roles. 
What is more, each social role inherently contains a “membership hypotheses” that connects “members” in contrast 
to “non-members” and that is a prerequisite for legitimizing the formulation of particular rights and duties. (The 
membership of a state, the membership of a nuclear family is implied in the formulation of the social role “citizen”.) 
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mediated relation between the growing awareness of individuality and that formative principle of 
societization (Vergesellschaftung) we have described as a fundamental multiplicity of social units.
Fourth. – So far, we have pointed out that social norms standardize actions and situations; 
that norm structures develop that connect the members of a social unit with a specific network 
of relationships (of rights and obligations); and that the individual as a member of various social 
units always is an intersection of various norm structures. The remaining question to ask is how 
the “existence” of norms can actually be recognized. If the concept of social norms in the context 
of sociology should be meaningful, empirical reference points of the validity of norms must be 
detectable. I have postponed posing the question so far because it leads us to a further, fourth 
phenomenon that is better explained at this point in the argument. 
Obviously, the validity of norms cannot simply be equated with the anticipated regularity 
of all types of behavior. There are many anticipated regularities – e.g. the custom to have lunch 
at a specific time of the day – that by no means have the character of obligations. It would be no 
problem at all to do it differently. We would like to speak of a norm only when the deviation 
from such anticipated regularities causes sanctions against the deviator such as demonstrative 
disapprovals, repressions, discriminations, or punishments. In these cases, the deviating actions of 
an individual or a number of individuals are followed by further actions of different people that relate 
to these deviations in a particular manner. 
The line between a custom and a social norm – for instance a (binding) custom – can, only 
then be definitely drawn when precedents exist. Not only for a sociologist, but also for the agent 
himself, especially for foreigners, the question of whether a generally usual behavior is binding or 
not may be kept in suspense: at least for as long as no deviation and reaction to it can be observed.
Yet who are these “others” who, as we have just insinuated, carry out sanctions? Can we simply 
say: those who are immediately affected by a deviant action that damages them, disadvantages 
them? This would be comparatively unequivocal but all too simplifying. For then we would have 
to interpret every act of private revenge as an execution of a sanction against a norm violator. Who 
a norm violator is would be determined in every case by the one whom, for some reason, plots 
revenge. 
Consequently, we cannot dispense with the notorious third party. Let us adopt Theodor 
Geiger’s term “group public”9 (Gruppenöffentlichkeit). For as long as someone damaged by 
deviant behavior has to rely on himself, his reaction is as much a private issue as is the deviant 
behavior itself. Only the support of the others, the group public, transforms the reaction so that it 
achieves the quality of a sanction. The first traces of such support become apparent when the group 
public ostentatiously disapproves of the deviant behavior while approving the affected person’s 
act of revenge that deviates from usual behavior, i.e. that is justified only because it is a reaction 
to a suffered injustice. Ethnographic materials, but also daily observations, tell us that there are 
numerous transitions from the demonstrative disapproval to the physical participation of the group 
public in the sanction (for instance in the shape of social boycott) and from here on again to the 
complete execution of the sanction by the group public. The latter case usually presupposes the 
existence of certain authorities that represent the group public (the “leader” in playgroups, the 
family father, certain superiors, the “opinion leaders”, etc.). We talk of legal norms when such 
authorities develop into a central instance that protects a specifiable number of social norms by 
virtue of its sole power to sanction. 
In our context, though, the focus is not on the delineation of this special case of social norms, 
the legal norms. (Of course, on the terminological level, the “threshold value” can be set earlier or 
later). What is important to us, though, is the insight that it is empirically demonstrable that social 
behavior is bound by norms existing without or beyond legal norms.
The decision on which kind of behavior is considered normative is not necessarily based 
on a verbal agreement; consequently, social norms cannot be identified by opinion polls. The 
sociological criteria reside solely in the participants’ actions. If anticipated regularities of social 
behavior are interpreted normatively, they can only be deduced from the reactions of the respective 
9 Geiger, Vorstudien, p. 33. Preliminary studies for a sociology of law.
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“others”, the group public (Gruppenöffentlichkeit) and, maybe, by its authorities and instances.10 
It is decisive whether certain modes of behavior are protected against obvious deviations – and, 
indeed, protected not only by those who might be immediately damaged. Correspondingly, the degree of 
the validity of social norms not only depends on their observance but also (equally) on the degree 
of readiness to execute the corresponding protective measures; on the degree of readiness to 
assert the claim of the permanent obligation against the breach of norms. Accordingly, not only 
a kind of action that asserts the statement: “This has been valid and is valid today” but also a 
reaction that implies: “This should also be valid in the future” realizes that social actions are bound 
by norms. 
Everything we have pointed out on the issue of normative behavior and norm structures 
so far must therefore be considered as a doubled obligation. Every social obligation of a person is 
matched by the protective functions of others. These protective functions are also linked up with 
the differentiation of social roles and with specific membership expectancies. The ways in which 
we meet them, in which we carry out sanctions, contributes as much to the maintenance of norm 
structures as to their alteration. 
Why also to their alteration? So far, we have merely ascertained that the emergence of social 
norms can be recognized by the execution of sanctions: a well-established type of behavior that is 
expected as usual becomes a norm postulated to be binding as soon as a deviation causes sanctions. 
A corresponding process may likewise be observed when a normative claim disappears: Deviations 
are – at first hesitatingly – tolerated, then more and more rarely provoke sanctions, until they – 
after a transitory phase of uncertainty –are eventually accepted. (Vivid examples for this process of 
the “acceptance” of hitherto normatively bound modes of behavior are provided by the so-called 
emancipation movements such as the emancipation of women, certain social classes, ethnic groups 
and peoples.)
Variations in the execution of sanctions can, therefore, serve as a seismograph enabling 
us to deduce changes in norm structures. However, this does not exhaust the relevance of the 
phenomenon. The execution of sanctions not only illustrates changes, it is itself the most precarious, 
delicate part of the normative system of actions. This is predominantly the case because it is usually 
also a normative obligation, although to a lower degree. The primary breach of law generally is 
condemned more strongly than the violation of the corresponding duty to report it, the immoral 
behavior more strongly than the lack of indignation. This lack of reaction may, of course, in turn 
also become subject to sanctions. However, somewhat simplified it seems appropriate to claim that 
the degree to which such secondary or tertiary reactions are binding will successively decrease. 
Although the abandonment of sanctions also contributes as much to the change of norm structures 
as does the primary breach of norms, it is usually less dangerous, more convenient, and often less 
visible. Consequently, the decrease of the validity of a norm becomes obvious when the majority 
of the people involved fail to react to the transgression, i.e. they act by doing nothing at all. At this 
point, for instance, the strategy to establish tyrannical regimes is (consciously or unconsciously) 
employed. The majority of the citizens, at first, are not led to breach primary norms, but are 
demoralized because the attempt is made to prevent it from executing sanctions against a breach 
of norms – i.e. to break it of the habit to react at all. The process of demoralization, at first, is only 
aimed at the readiness to counter the breach of a norm with the assessment of the continuing 
validity of this norm. The readiness for action is prepared by the abandonment of the reaction. This 
is what calling the execution of sanctions the most labile, vulnerable part of the normative system 
of actions means.  
Fifth. – Social norms can be handed on from one generation to the next. Every education has 
the aim to hand on certain contents of norms. Often, this is accomplished very poorly. However, 
10 The analyses of reactions to breaches of norms (and also in a broader sense: the prevention of breaches of norms) 
arrange themselves around the keyword “social control”. An important contribution to the theory of social control is 
provided by Homans, Georg Caspar, The Human Group, New York, 1950: “The separate controls are nothing more 
than the old relations of mutual dependence taken differentially,” p. 301. The German translation adds that specific 
controls are defined by the relations that exist between a person’s noncompliance with a norm and the various 
consequences this noncompliance entails (J. H.).
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that it can be accomplished at all and probably never completely fails is a condition of the possibility 
of any continuity of social forms of life and behavioral norms. 
Once more, let us ask: why can this be accomplished? Once more the answer is commonplace. 
Yet, this is exactly the issue: to find, among the multitude of phenomena we consider natural in 
social life, some of those that actually are. So how can education reach the goal to hand on social 
norms?
Inheritance does not solve this problem. A “taking-over” of specific norms can apparently 
only succeed when the child not only follows the demands made on its behavior, but when it, 
indeed, takes them over, i.e. when it internalizes the claims that it is confronted with by the external 
world so that they become self-imposed claims. By no means does this imply a reflected moral 
philosophy. The “ought” can indeed remain bound to certain actions and certain situations. We 
also do not insinuate that the subjugation to social obligations can always be traced back to moral 
motives. Personal interests, the fear of sanctions, and the like will frequently play a part – if they 
are not decisive. Yet, apart from these considerations, it might be exactly the notion that a certain 
act or its neglect may be binding “in itself”, and thus can become an individual’s motive to act. And 
this notion of what in itself is binding is teachable and learnable. Only because of this does it make 
sense to say that humans are the creatures able to ought to do something.  
It seems to me, that the most general, and at the same time, arguably the most important feature 
of this learnability of directives stating what ought to be done, is that we can habitualize obligations. 
Or, to express it in more illustrative terms: The directives stating what ought to be done can develop 
from impositions posed by the outside world to an “internalized natural requirement.” Exactly this 
transformation makes it possible that we follow directives ordering us to do something without 
any deliberation – which is proven by everyday experience. Accordingly, to ask whether we can 
trace back every phenomenon illustrating that social actions are norm bound either to personal 
interests or to a conscious orientation toward norms – or to a mixture of both – would be wrong. 
And it is just as misleading to contrast social actions alternatively as habitual or norm bound. A 
habit, frequently is the result of having “learned what ought to be done”. And contrariwise: That 
directives stating what ought to be done can be learned and, more importantly, habitualised, is 
expressed in the fact that such directives can be perceived as having been “already available”, as 
being unproblematic, the self-evident option. They can become an answer that does not require a 
previous question. 
At this point, I would like to stop and close with a general consideration on the type of question 
that I have tried to follow. In order to proceed, analogous investigations, especially into phenomena 
of superordination and subjugation as part of social coexistence, would be necessary, on influence, 
on power, on dominion and, eventually: on violence – the almost unfathomable phenomenon, 
which in extreme cases links the highest degree of reality in a vital-physical sense with the highest 
degree of abstraction in the social sense. 
The question pursued here asks for the conditions of the possibility of human coexistence. Just 
how is, to put it in Durkheim’s words, “the fact society” possible? How is it possible that humans 
can – with some certainty and continuity – become attuned to one another? 
I consider this question to be answerable. And this is because people cannot find common ground 
if they do not initiate a process of shaping this “common ground.”11 The formative process of shaping 
the common ground enters, or better, permeates through stabilizations, shells, crystallizations, and 
institutionalizations. There are conditions influencing these processes of shaping the common ground, 
principles of constructions of the “shells” of human coexistence to whose determination we do 
(and have to) contribute to when we want to gain ground against the chaos caused by the absence 
of relationships. These conditions can be found – namely beyond the familiarities and trivialities of 
daily life that usually block our view of the inevitable in social life rather than sharpen it. 
11 As is generally known, this is the fundamental ideal of Georg Simmel’s sociology whose wording I would also like 
to adopt here; cf. Soziologie 4, Berlin 1958, S. 5. On the misunderstanding concerning the denigration of Simmel’s 
achievements as specifically “formal” sociology, see: Tenbruck, Friedrich H.: Georg Simmel in: Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Cologne Journal for Sociology and Social Psychology), X, 1958, p. 587– 614. 
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Human coexistence can certainly as much be described as an incomplete “integration” as an 
incomplete “disintegration.” Our question, by no means implicitly presumes the existence of an 
“absolute order” that is as much a fiction as is the old formula of the war of all against all. It is, to 
point this out once more, aimed at those achievements of the social productivity of human beings 
that lift our coexistence one tick mark above the voluntary, accidental, or unpredictable. We cannot 
know where the limits of the ability of humans to define themselves in social terms are. I believe 
we can, however, on experiential grounds know which conditions must also be determined when 
humans “socially define” themselves.
